This article contributes to current debates in materialist geopolitics and contemporary IR theorising by restating the centrality of social forces for conceptualising geopolitics. It does so by offering a detailed conceptual reading of the corpus of the 'Eastern Question', which is composed of a series of political analyses written by Marx and Engels in the period of 1853-56. This archive presents unique analytical and conceptual insights beyond the immediate temporal scope of the issue. I unpack this argument in three movements. The paper (I) offers an overview of the debates on materialist geopolitics, (II) contextualises the historical setting of the 'Eastern Question' and critically evaluates the great powers' commitment to the European status quo, and (III) constructs an original engagement with a largely overlooked corpus to reveal the ways in which Marx and Engels demonstrated the interwoven relationship between domestic class interests, the state and the international system. I maintain that revisiting the 'Eastern Question' corpus (I) bolsters the existing materialist frameworks by underscoring the role of class as an analytical category, (II) challenges an important historical pillar of the balance of power argument, and (III) empirically strengthens the burgeoning scholarship in international historical sociology. 
that the end of the Cold War signalled neither a step towards a more peaceful world, nor to 'the end point of human ideological evolution beyond which it was impossible to progress further', 3 the study of geopolitics has proliferated across disciplines, armed with variegated methodologies. From its multiplex reincarnations within mainstream IR approaches to a plethora of deconstructive methodologies devised under the mantle of critical geopolitics and IR, geopolitics has re-entrenched its position as a significant area of study in which dominant practices and narratives embedded in inter-state relations can be explained and/or unveiled.
Since its initial emergence in the late 1980s, critical geopolitics scholarship has taken the lead in unmasking the ideological roots of classical geopolitical discourse. While critical geographers have carefully explored the social Darwinist bent of classical geopolitical scholarship and exposed its pretense of offering a ''scientific' method' of inter-state relations as a 'field of discourse within the long-established domain of geopower, defined as the entwined historical development of geographical knowledge with state power and its imperatives of governmentality', 4 Marxist approaches-to varying degrees-have attempted to position geopolitics within a lateral space of convergence between the capitalist mode of production and the international states-system. 5 The theoretical endeavours to unveil the specific conditions with which these two 'layers' are 'superimposed' 6 within a structural whole have multiplied greatly with a number of important contributions by, inter alia, Giovanni Arrighi, David Harvey and Ellen
Meiksins Wood which directly draw from or attempt to reinvent Marxist theories of imperialism to disentangle the mechanisms of contemporary geopolitics. 7 Coupled with these efforts is a new wave of materi- and investigates the ways in which territory is 'valorised' by capitalism. 9 But while the proponents of Marxist geopolitics maintain that a distinctly Marxist methodology of geopolitics could go beyond the 'discursive' focus of critical geopolitics, thus could fully 'exhaust the potential of geopolitics', 10 critical geopoliticians have identified a number of pitfalls that Marxists seem to have revived from the grave of a long-gone conception of geopolitical analysis. These apparent limitations include the reintroduction of state-centrism, the conceptual framework's dangerously close proximity to the 'old-style realist accounts of international relations' 11 and the omission of agency.
To address some of the fundamental issues raised in these contemporary debates, I revisit and offer a detailed reading of Karl Marx's and Friedrich Engels' writings on the 'Eastern Question' and a survey of the inter-imperialist rivalry in the nineteenth century with regards to the specific issue of the territorial 'management' of the Ottoman Empire. 12 Composed of a series of articles written in the period of 1853-1856, this archive, which deals with one of the primary occupations of nineteenth century international relations, 13 presents unique analytical and conceptual insights beyond the immediate temporal scope of the issue. 14 By constructing an exegesis of this under-utilised archive, the paper: Harvey's main aim in emphasising the importance of controlling natural resources is to signal how '[g]eographical expansion and spatial reorganization' are utilised to onset the 'chronic tendency within capitalism', that is 'the tendency for the profit rate to fall, to produce crises of overaccumulation'.
33
Harvey theorises this intermixed dynamic of political authority and capital accumulation within the international system by entering a dialogue with Giovanni Arrighi's two 'modes of rule or logics of power' in the form of 'capitalism' and 'territorialism'. Arrighi's initial formulation of these two logics articulated first a territorial rule which identifies 'power with the extent and populousness of their domains' and subjugates capital as a 'by-product of the pursuit of territorial expansion'; and second, a capitalist rule which gives primacy to 'command over scarce resources'.
34
Harvey's appropriation of the territorial and capitalist logics is based on the same blueprint and aims to explain how 'the relative fixity and distinctive logic of territorial power fit with the fluid dynamics of capital accumulation'.
35
Despite the influence and popularity the book enjoys in a broad spectrum of the social sciences, it is difficult to conclude that The New Imperialism has solved the perennial Marxist problématique of explaining the relationship between the capitalist mode of production and the (capitalist) state/international states-system. The kind of imperial geopolitics Harvey attempts to unveil in his analysis has been criticised for lacking the 'political' part of the equation, or as Noel Castree has bluntly put, shares Political Marxists' recognition that 'the plurality of the geopolitical spaces is not co-emergent with capitalism', and in contrast to the logics of power approach, it refuses to derive geopolitics 'from within a theory of capital'.
48
A detailed discussion of these theories falls beyond the scope of this paper, but for our purposes it is important to highlight that both theories, while carefully avoiding the shortcomings of the logics of Inspired by a materialist conception of history, we view territoriality as a social process, constantly drawn and redrawn by the production, circulation and accumulation of value, as well as by the relations of power accompanying the global reproduction of capitalism. A Marxist geopolitics, in essence, begins by analysing the capitalist valorisation of territory and ends by explaining its international repercussions.
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This brief intervention, however, has not met with much sympathy from the critical geopolitics camp.
Among the responses Colás and Pozo-Martin have garnered in and after the Geopolitics forum, critical voices highlighted that their 'Marxist' geopolitics is vulnerable to 'the tendency to downplay the role of human perception of the situation and the extent of choice' as well as to 'the old base-superstructure conception of causation that has bedevilled Marxism since its founding'. 57 Felix Ciut echoed Agnew's above-cited observation that 'Marxist' geopolitics looks uncannily similar to 'old-style realist accounts of international relations' by claiming that 'the authors are actually a lot more like the lay geopoliticians they study than they would like to admit'. 59 While it is not my intention to respond to these comments within the parameters set by the intervention of Colás and Pozo-Martin, it should be noted that the authors' previous work partially pre-empts some of the charges levelled againt their vision of 'Marxist' geopolitics. See for example, Pozo-Martin's engagement with the new imperialist conceptions of geopolitics (particularly the one espoused by Callinicos) in which the author underscores the necessity to attend the issues 'agency and micro-foundations'. Pozo-Martin,'Autonomous or materialist geopolitics?', 552.
global power'. 60 The main aim of the discussion is to place a stronger emphasis on class relations and the ways in which domestic class relations/interests are reflected on international politics. Accordingly, the article fulfils a double objective in the following discussion by: (I) Reconstructing the episode of 'Eastern Question' as a conceptual lens with which to explicate how Marx and Engels analysed the geopolitical relations and discourse of inter-imperialist rivalry in the nineteenth century, (II) reaffirming the centrality of class as an analytical register in the study of geopolitics. It is my contention that the 'Eastern Question' offers significant tools for the realisation of a non-determinist Marxist geopolitical framework and recovers class from being 'a gaping hole in the account of the interests that geopolitics stood for' by recognising its constitutive role in the formulation of geopolitical relations and imaginaries that sustained them.
61

Marx and Engels on the 'Eastern Question'
The Ottoman Empire's quest for stability in the nineteenth century was hampered by an increasingly hostile international milieu. Despite the fact that the Ottoman state 'expanded the area under its direct administration' through a bold reform programme, it simultaneously lost control of a number of significant territories, including Greece, Algeria, and-by recognising their autonomy-Egypt and Serbia. 62 The early multidirectional expansion of the empire which halted by the eighteenth century shifted to a gradual shrinking of territory and sovereign control. Struggling against a relentless Russian expansionism in the Balkans and the Black Sea, the empire was plagued with the secession of Serbia (an autonomous principality as of 1815) and Greece (which won independence in 1830). On the Arab peninsula, Wahabbi revolts gravely crippled the Ottoman authority over an already loosely held territory. The meteoric rise of Mehmed Ali Paşa in Egypt and his 'desire to carve out an empire for himself at the expense of the Sultan's own empire' further deteriorated the state's attempts to re-exert its authority over provinces. 63 Rapidly turning into a major impediment to the ongoing recentralisation, Mehmed Ali constituted a direct ers' offer to intervene on behalf of the Ottoman dynasty and push back the Egyptian army which was already stationed at the heart of Anatolia.
The Czar's rush to the defense of the Ottoman dynasty against Mehmed Ali should not disguise Russia's own expansionary ambitions which manifested clearly when it directly marched to ̇stanbul in 1828 after capturing the previous Ottoman capital Edirne (Adrianople). In the same period, Russia's attempts to dismember the empire, take over ̇stanbul and the prized Balkan possessions as well as to control the lengthy eastern Anatolian border intensified and became the 'ultimate goals of Russian policy'.
64
The threat of a 'Greater Russia' reigning over the entire Black Sea, the straits and the colossal area covering the majority of southeastern Europe gave enough rhetorical ammunition for Western powers to push for the protection of Ottoman territorial integrity and concomitantly brought about the question that would haunt the European decision-makers for decades: 'What is to be done with Turkey?' should it collapse. According to the established narrative, the prospect of a catastrophic conflict ostensibly led European powers to take measures towards the Empire's preservation.
Not all were satisfied with this arguably pan-European policy of the protection of a country that
William Gladstone defined as 'the one great anti-human specimen of humanity'. 67 In a letter dated 1854, liberal statesman John Bright lambasted the British foreign policy for its 'false' orientation towards the Ottomans and claimed that the British policy was ensuring 'the perpetual maintenance of the most immoral and filthy of all despotisms over one of the fairest portions of the earth which it has desolated, and over a population it has degraded but has not been able to destroy'. Why, it was precisely to maintain the status quo that Russia stirred up Serbia to revolt, made Greece independent, appropriated to herself the protectorate of Moldavia and Wallachia, and retained part of Armenia! England and France never stirred an inch when all this was done. The solution of the Turkish problem is reserved, with that of other great problems, to the European Revolution. And there is no presumption in assigning this apparently remote question to the lawful domain of that great movement. The revolutionary landmarks have been steadily advancing ever since 1789. The last revolutionary outposts were Warsaw, Debreczin, Bucharest; the advanced posts of the next revolution must be Petersburg and Constantinople.
88
Thus a working-class revolution, implicitly a European one, 89 was not only registered as the ultimate outcome of the ongoing (geo)political and social conflicts in Eurasia, it was also poised to unleash a transformative momentum which would invalidate the crises that the uneven development of capitalism was perpetuating:
The Sultan holds Constantinople only in trust for the Revolution, and the present nominal dignitaries of Western Europe, themselves finding the last stronghold of their 'order' on the shores of the Neva, can do nothing but keep the question in suspense until Russia has to meet her real antagonist, the Revolution. The Revolution which will break the Rome of the West will also overpower the demoniac influences of the Rome of the East. 'These same 'gallant' free-traders, renowned for their indefatigability in denouncing government interference, these apostles of the bourgeois doctrine of laissez-faire, who profess to leave everything and everybody to the struggles of individual interest, are always the first to appeal to the interference of Government as soon as the individual interests of the workingman come into conflict with their own class interests. In such moments of collision they look with open admiration at the Continental States, where despotic governments, though, indeed, not allowing the bourgeoisie to rule, at least prevent the workingmen from resisting'. See MECW 12, 135.
ences. For example, some Manchester merchants with vested interests in the Ottoman market were perturbed with the possibility of a Russian victory which could signal the removal of the Ottoman Empire from the sphere of the British commercial influence. 96 Industrialists and the fractions of the commercial bourgeoisie whose immediate interests laid elsewhere followed Cobden's line as his staunch resistance to the British involvement in the Ottoman-Russian conflict was coupled with his belief that 'England would gain rather than suffer' if 'Russia were to subjugate Turkey'. 97 Cobden would, indeed, continue to praise the development of the Russian commerce and argue that 'wherever a country is found to favour foreign commerce . . . it may infallibly be assumed, that England partakes more largely of the advantages of that traffic than any other state'.
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Cobden's pro-Russian 'neutrality', which was rooted in the assumption that the commercial interests of the British bourgeoisie would remain secure regardless of Britain's involvement in the conflict,
should not obscure the degree to which the Ottoman market had been colonised by the British up to the 1850s. While '[u]ntil c. 1820, trade within the empire and with Russia certainly was more important than that with Western and Central Europe', by 1850s European companies had already 'made a significant entry into the Ottoman markets to a degree that extended beyond the major urban centers'. 99 The processes that reinforced this expansion materialised largely due to political interventions rather than the 'eco- How did it happen, that the poor Times believed in the 'good faith' of Russia toward Turkey, and her 'antipathy' against all aggrandizement? The good will of Russia toward Turkey! Peter I proposed to raise himself on the ruins of Turkey. Catherine persuaded Austria, and called upon France to participate in the proposed dismemberment of Turkey, and the establishment of a Greek Empire at Constantinople, under her grandson, who had been educated and even named with a view to this result. Nicholas, more moderate, only demands the exclusive Protectorate of Turkey. Mankind will not forget that Russia was the protector of Poland, the protector of the Crimea, the protector of Courland, the protector of Georgia, Mingrelia, the Circassian and Caucasian tribes. And now Russia, the protector of Turkey!
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This demonstration of the sensitivity Marx and Engels showed vis-à-vis the material sources, discursive legitimisation and ideological construction of inter-state relations in the mid-nineteenth century highlights the value of existing conceptual apparatuses for the efforts to construct a framework of Marxist geopolitics. Simultaneously, the multifaceted-but ultimately class and production oriented-framework fleshed out in this article suggests that the source material can also speak to methodologically divergent approaches in critical geopolitics, which, apart from a small number of publications, have largely shied away from entering into a productive dialogue with Marxism.
Conclusion
The above outlined snapshot of the corpus on the 'Eastern Question' aimed to reinforce Marxist frameworks of geopolitical analysis that stress the centrality of class relations and the interaction between states and the mode of production. Following Terry Kandal, such a framework is concerned primarily with how geopolitical relations 'are conditioned by, but not reduced to, the uneven development of capitalism and the class conflicts within nation-states'. 112 As such, the critical evaluation put forward by Marx and Engels on the ever-changing conditions of the preservation of the Ottoman territorial integrity marks the necessity of delineating the ways in which prima facie territorial struggles and geopolitical conflicts are
